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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT                        
_____________ 
 
No. 15-1673 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
 v. 
 
 DEBORAH CASSINI, 
                     Appellant  
_____________ 
        
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania                                                            
District Court No. 2-13-cr-00322-001 
District Judge: The Honorable Cathy Bissoon 
                               
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
October 8, 2015 
 
Before: FUENTES, SMITH, and BARRY, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: October 30, 2015)                              
_____________________ 
 
  OPINION* 
_____________________        
                       
                                                 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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SMITH, Circuit Judge.  
 On August 6, 2014, Deborah Cassini pleaded guilty to a seven-count indictment 
consisting of four counts of wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343 and three counts 
of filing false income tax returns in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1).  Cassini’s 
Sentencing Guidelines range was 37 to 48 months of imprisonment.  Cassini filed a 
motion for a downward departure based on family ties and responsibilities, U.S.S.G. § 
5H1.6, and a motion for a downward variance to a non-custodial sentence based on the 
factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  The District Court denied both motions and 
sentenced Cassini to 42 months of imprisonment and a 3-year term of supervised release 
for the wire fraud counts to run concurrently with 36 months of imprisonment and a 1-
year term of supervised release for the tax counts.  Cassini was also ordered to make 
restitution in the amount of $647,107.89.  On March 17, 2015, she appealed the District 
Court’s denial of both of her motions.  We will affirm.1 
 Cassini first argues that the District Court erred in rejecting her request for a 
downward departure based on U.S.S.G. § 5H1.6 on account of the health of her husband.  
Generally, “[w]e do not have jurisdiction to review discretionary decisions by district 
courts to not depart downward.”  United States v. Vargas, 477 F.3d 94, 103 (3d Cir. 
2007); United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 333 (3d Cir. 2006) (stating that this Court 
“declin[es] to review, after [United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005)], a district 
court’s decision to deny departure”), abrogated on other grounds by Rita v. United 
                                                 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have 
jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007).  The narrow exception to this rule provides that we may 
review the denial of a departure where the record reflects that the sentencing court did not 
understand its legal authority to do so.  Id.  The sentencing colloquy makes clear that the 
District Court understood its authority to depart downward and simply chose not to.  
Because the District Court exercised its discretion and did not misunderstand its legal 
authority to depart, we lack jurisdiction to review its refusal to depart downward. 
 Cassini also challenges the District Court’s denial of her motion for a variance 
under the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  A variance, which is 
distinguishable from a departure, United States v. Vampire Nation, 451 F.3d 189, 197-98 
(3d Cir. 2006), is subject to a two-step review.  First, using an abuse-of-discretion 
standard of review, we ensure that the district court “‘committed no significant 
procedural error in arriving at its decision.’”  United States v. Harris, 751 F.3d 123, 128 
(3d Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Wise, 515 F.3d 207, 217 (3d Cir. 2008)); United 
States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567-68 (3d Cir. 2009).  Where there is no substantial 
procedural error, we next review, also under an abuse-of-discretion standard, the 
“substantive reasonableness” of the sentence.  Id. 
 Cassini argues that “it is clear that complete, reasoned assessment of all 
[§ 3553(a)] factors was not undertaken.”  Appellant Br. 24.  The sentencing colloquy 
belies this argument.  The District Court evaluated each § 3553(a) factor in denying 
Cassini’s request for a downward variance.  Accordingly, the District Court committed 
no procedural error. 
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 With regard to the substantive reasonableness of Cassini’s sentence, we similarly 
conclude that the District Court committed no error.  Generally we “will affirm [a 
sentence] unless no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence 
on that particular defendant for the reasons the district court provided.”  Tomko, 562 F.3d 
at 568.  Issuing a middle-of-the-guidelines-range sentence, the District Court undertook 
an “‘appropriate and judicious consideration of the relevant factors.’”  See United States 
v. Lessner, 498 F.3d 185, 204 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Schweitzer, 454 
F.3d 197, 204 (3d Cir. 2006)).  Cassini, who bears the burden of proof, id., points to 
alternative inferences the District Court could have drawn at sentencing.  This simply is 
not enough to establish that the District Court abused its discretion, particularly given the 
District Court’s detailed discussion of the § 3553(a) factors.   
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
 
